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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 13-2219 
_____________ 
 
JARRET FATE, 
 
            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NATHAN HARPER, Former Pittsburgh Police Chief;  
FORMER CMDR. GEORGE TROSKY;  
CITY OF PITTSBURGH  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania                                                        
District Court  No. 2-12-cv-00459 
District Judge: The Honorable Arthur J. Schwab                            
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 4, 2014 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  March 5, 2014) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.   
2 
 
I. 
Appellant Jarret Fate (“Fate”) filed this civil rights action after he was 
assaulted by an off-duty Pittsburgh police officer, Detective Bradley Walker 
(“Detective Walker” or “Walker”). Fate named as defendants the City of 
Pittsburgh (the “City”) and two of Detective Walker’s supervisors, Chief Nathan 
Harper (“Chief Harper”) and Commander George Trosky (“Commander Trosky”). 
Fate alleged that defendants deprived him of rights protected by the Constitution 
because they failed to adequately address numerous prior complaints that Detective 
Walker had engaged in excessively violent conduct, both during the performance 
of his duties and while off-duty.  
The matter proceeded to trial, and at the close of Fate’s case-in-chief, the 
District Court entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of Chief Harper and 
Commander Trosky. The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of the City. 
Fate now appeals the dismissal of his claims against Chief Harper and the verdict 
in favor of the City.
1
 For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
II. 
 On the morning of May 1, 2010, Fate and Detective Walker were involved 
in a car collision just outside of Pittsburgh. At the time of the accident, Detective 
Walker was off-duty, wearing plainclothes, and driving his private vehicle. After 
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  Fate does not appeal the dismissal of his claims against Commander Trosky. 
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both cars pulled to the side of the road, Detective Walker walked over to Fate’s 
vehicle, stuck his hands through the window, and grabbed Fate and began choking 
him. Fate drove off, but was pursued by Detective Walker who eventually pulled 
his car in front of Fate’s vehicle to block his escape. Walker then got out of his car, 
drew his police-approved firearm, and approached Fate’s vehicle screaming 
profanities and threatening to shoot. At no point did Detective Walker identify 
himself as a police officer. 
Detective Walker instructed Fate to exit his vehicle and to produce his 
license and registration, but Fate refused to move. At this point, Walker, acting in 
what an observer described as an “extreme fit of rage,” punched and shattered 
Fate’s windshield and driver’s side window, sending glass into Fate’s face. 
Detective Walker then began to kick and punch the side of Fate’s vehicle, 
declaring that he was “teaching [Fate] a lesson.”  
Eventually, Detective Walker forced open the driver’s side door and Fate 
began to exit the car. As Fate was exiting the car, Walker began to notice a crowd 
of people stopped in their cars and observing the incident. Still holding his weapon, 
Detective Walker turned to the onlookers and screamed, “What the f--- are you 
looking at?” Detective Walker then slammed his gun on the roof of the car and 
once again demanded Fate’s license and registration. Fate complied with the 
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request and Detective Walker scribbled down the information. He then threw the 
documents back in the car, and left the scene.  
The City’s Office of Municipal Investigations later reviewed the incident 
and brought charges against Detective Walker for conduct unbecoming of a police 
officer. Those charges were sustained and Detective Walker was terminated. 
Additionally, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania brought criminal charges against 
Detective Walker and, on April 12, 2011, he was convicted in state court of 
assault, reckless endangerment, criminal mischief, and harassment. He was ordered 
to pay restitution.  
 A copy of Detective Walker’s disciplinary record reveals more than thirty 
complaints of excessive force that predate the incident with Fate. After reviewing 
the complaints, the Office of Municipal Investigations determined that most were 
either unfounded or unsubstantiated. A few episodes, however, were more credible 
and serious, including claims that Detective Walker choked and hit his own wife 
and son, that he unnecessarily slammed a woman’s hand in a door five or six times, 
and that he had used his police authority to threaten another driver following a 
collision that occurred while he was off-duty. Despite the fact that several 
complaints were sustained, Detective Walker received only minor discipline. 
Indeed, he never received more than a one-day suspension. 
 On April 10, 2012, Fate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United 
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States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against Chief Harper 
and the City of Pittsburgh, alleging that, by failing to impose harsher discipline 
and/or terminate Detective Walker based on the prior complaints, they were 
deliberately indifferent to the risk that Detective Walker would continue engaging 
in unnecessarily violent conduct. Further, Fate contended that the City’s policy of 
failing to investigate or discipline officers like Detective Walker somehow caused 
Detective Walker’s assault.  
 A jury trial commenced on March 18, 2013. At the close of Fate’s case-in-
chief, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law as to all claims. After 
hearing from the parties, the District Court granted judgment as a matter of law in 
favor of Chief Harper, but denied the motion as to the City. In dismissing the 
claims against Chief Harper, the Court pointed out that all complaints against 
Detective Walker were, pursuant to department policy, first investigated by the 
City’s Office of Municipal Investigations, and that Chief Harper was “confined by 
the OMI process,” which only permitted him to take corrective action when a 
complaint was sustained. App. 531, 534. Although numerous complaints were filed 
against Detective Walker, the Court noted that only a handful were sustained, and 
in those instances Chief Harper imposed discipline. The Court held that while 
reasonable minds might disagree about whether Chief Harper should have imposed 
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harsher discipline, “those judgment calls certainly do not rise to a level of 
‘deliberate indifference.’”  
The claims against the City were then submitted to the jury. Fate argued that 
the jury should only be instructed to determine whether defendants “caused” 
Detective Walker’s assault. The District Court, however, rejected this argument, 
and instructed the jury that “Plaintiff must prove . . . : First, [that] former Detective 
Walker acted under color of law.” Because the jury concluded that Detective 
Walker did not act under color of law, the District Court entered judgment in favor 
of the City.  
Fate timely appeals.
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III. 
 Fate raises three separate issues on appeal. First, he contends the District 
Court erred by requiring the jury to find—as a prerequisite for his claims against 
the City—that Detective Walker acted under color of law. Second, he argues that 
the Court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Chief Harper. 
And third, he contends the Court erroneously permitted defendants to argue that 
their disciplinary decisions were influenced by past decisions of the union-
mandated arbitrators reversing officer terminations.  
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  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3), 
(4). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
7 
 
 We find no error in the District Court’s instruction requiring the jury to find 
that Detective Walker acted under color of law before imposing liability against 
the City. Section 1983 affords a remedy for constitutional deprivations brought 
about by state actors. Here, however, the jury determined that Detective Walker 
was acting as a private citizen when he assaulted Fate. Without state action, there 
can be no constitutional deprivation. And if Detective Walker did not violate the 
constitution, “it is inconceivable that [the City] could be liable to [Fate].” City of 
Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); see also Pitchell v. Callan, 13 
F.3d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1994). Moreover, the Supreme Court has been clear that “a 
State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not 
constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. 
Dep’t of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). 
 Fate’s reliance on Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720 
(3d Cir. 1989), is misplaced. In Stoneking, a former high school student sued her 
school district and its officials under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment for 
failing to protect her from a band teacher who sexually assaulted her over a period 
of years. But in Stoneking, there was no question that the band teacher was acting 
under color of law when he sexually assaulted the plaintiff. Indeed, the Court noted 
that much of the abuse alleged in the complaint “occurred in the course of [the 
band teacher’s] performance of his official responsibilities, such as during school-
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sponsored events and trips, and sometimes on school property.” Stoneking, 882 
F.2d at 724. As a result, the Court did not directly confront the situation we face—
where the state employee’s wrongful conduct was unquestionably not under color 
of law. Because Detective Walker was not acting under color of law, we agree with 
the District Court that there was no basis for a municipal liability claim against the 
City.
3
 
 Because we accept the jury’s determination that Detective Walker was not 
acting under color of law, and thus his conduct was not attributable to the state, we 
need not consider the other arguments raised in this appeal. Without any state 
action depriving Fate of his constitutional rights, there can be no supervisory 
liability against Chief Harper. Additionally, Fate’s evidentiary challenges had no 
bearing on the jury’s determination that Detective Walker was not acting under 
color of law.  
For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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  We note that Fate briefly attempts to use what amounts to a failure to train 
argument to find the City liable. While this could be an alternative theory of liability, 
absent a finding that Detective Walker acted under color of law, we are not persuaded by 
Fate’s attempts. See Reitz v. Cnty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Failure to 
train can serve as a basis for § 1983 liability only ‘where the failure to train amounts to 
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into 
contact.’”) (quoting Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). While we acknowledge 
that Detective Walker’s actions were egregious, we cannot attribute Fate’s injuries to any 
policy, practice, nor failure to train, on the part of the City of Pittsburgh. Detective 
Walker’s actions in this incident were those of a private actor and were not prompted by 
any policy or practice implemented by the City of Pittsburgh or Detective Walker’s 
superiors. 
